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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTRY CLUB FOODS,
Plaintiff and Respondent, Case
No. 9192

vs.
GALE V. BARNEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant's retrospective examination of the evidence in
its statement of facts will require a review of the evidence
pertinent to the issues raised on appeal. However, no extended
discussion of th facts will be made at this time save in the
following particulars:
Defendant, as he approached in an easterly direction
the intersection of Third South and Sixth East Streets, was
3
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watching to the South, and at no time saw Plaintiff's vehicle until a second or two before the collision. Mr. Gale,
Plaintiff's agent, looked at Defendant's vehicle twice, once
when he was one-quarter of a block from the intersection,
and a moment before impact; but he also noticed Defendant's
vehicle by his peripheral vision as he was coming down
the street, and as he entered the intersection. When Mr. Gale
became aware of the imminence of a collision, he accelerated
his vehicle and swerved first to the left, and then to the right
to avoid an impact. Officer Williams, who investigated the
accident, testified that Mr. Gale left slide marks, commencing
at the intersection, which indicated· Mr. Gale had turned
sharply to the left and then to the right before impact. The
front end of Defendant's vehicle collided with the right
rear of Plaintiff's truck at a point in the intersection where
the front end of Plaintiff's vehicle was passing the southern
edge of Third South Street.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE
WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED
TO THE COLLISION. (Reply to Defendant's Point 1 and 2).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE
4
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WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED
TO THE COLLISION. (Reply to Defendant's Point 1 and 2).
Defendant states he relies upon the testimony elicited
from Plaintiffs agent, Lavoy B. Gale, to substantiate his argument to Point 1, contending that Respondent's agent was
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. It is fundamental that
an Appellate Court may determine a question as a matter of
law ony when convinced that reasonabe persons coud not
disagree upon the question when conscientiously applying fact
to law. Covington vs. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d, 378 294 Pac. 2d,
788.
Mr. Gale testified that he was driving Plaintiffs one
and one-haff ton Chevrolet Pickup in a southerly direction
on Sixth East Street and was one-quarter of a block from
the intersection of Third South when he first noticed the
vehicle driven by Defendant. He estimated Defendant's vehicle to be one-half block from the intersection, proceeding
in an easterly direction. Defendant's brief states Mr. Gale
did not look to his right again and proceeded into the intersection. A close examination of his testimony does not warrant
such a conclusion.
BY THE COURT: State whether or not you looked
at all toward this car after you saw it the first time
when as you say it was about a half a block away.
A. Yes, sir, as I went through the intersection I looked
and observed the car and that's when I took my
decision to swerve and accelerate my truck.

Q. Let me ask you then, from the first time that you
noticed the vehicle until the time that you entered

5
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the intersection, aid you observe the defendant's
car, either through your peripheral vision or by
looking at it?
MR. KIPP: I will object as being repetitious. He testified that he did not.
THE COURT: Well, I will let him answer if he can.
A. I noticed the vehicle, like I say, prior to coming
down the street. And as I entered the intersection
and a moment before the point of impact, I did
see the vehicle then. Accelerated my truck and
swerved to miss it. (Tr. 21).
Defendant's brief further assumes that Defendant had the
directional right-of-way merely by proceeding towards an
intersection on the right of Plaintiff. It is clear that the law
of directional right-of-way will be invoked only when two
vehicles enter an intersection at the same time (U~C.A. 416-72

(b).

However, the Trial Court well determined Plaintiff to
be the favored driver, and such finding was substantiated by
the evidence. When Mr. Gale was questioned regarding this
subject, he stated on direct examination:
Q. I see. Had you taken any precautions before this
time?

A. I didn't deem them necessary. I figured I had the
clearance and was far enough ahead to make the
intersection.
Q. Were you able to determine which car had entered
the intersection first?
A. I was. (Tr. Page 16).

6
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And upon cross examination of Defendant, the following
question was presented to him:

Q. Which vehicle to your knowledge entered the intersection first?
A. I don't know. (Tr. 26).
And the Court made final determination regarding which
party was the favored driver as follows:
MR. BEESLEY: By way of rebuttal, I would like to
put him on the stand merely to reiterate which
vehicle entered first. I am not sure that was before
the Court or not.
THE COURT: Well, that, I think, was made an issue
in the beginning.
MR. BEESLEY: I believe that it was.
THE COURT: Or, in other words, your witness testified that he was a quarter of a block away when
he saw the other one a half block away and the
testimony is that they were driving at about the
same speed. So I guess that covers it.
MR. BEESLEY: I won't have anything further then,
your Honor. (Tr. 27).
This Court has frequently enunciated the effect of the
rules of right-of-way:
"The right-of-way rules simply mean this: that if
two persons are so preceding that if they continued their
course, there would be danger of collision, the disfavored one must give way, and the favored one may
proceed; and the favored one may as~ume that this
will be done." Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d, 381, 275
Pac. 2d 684.
7
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To be sure, the favored driver cannot totally ignore the
other and blindly traverse the intersection, but until he is otherwise put on notice, he can presume that the disfavored driver
will slow down and permit him to pass. Concurring in the case
of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 Pac. 2d, 350, 354, Mr.
Chief Justice Wolfe said:

'' * * * we must be careful not to stretch contributory
negligence to the point where we make it encumbant
upon one no tonly to drive carefully himself, but to
drive so carefully as always to be prepared for some
sudden burst of negligence of another, and be able
to avoid it. * * *
"Although plaintiff had the right-of-way under both
rules above referred to, yet there devolved upon him
the duty of due care in observing for other traffic. But
in doing so, he had the right to assume, and to rely,
and to act upon the assumption that others would do
likewise; he was not obliged to anticipate either that
other drivers would drive negligently, nor fail to
accord him his right-o-way, until in the exercise of
due care, he observed, or should have observed, something to warn him that the other driver was driving
negligently, or would fail to accord him his right-ofway. If this principal is not clear in the earlier Utah
cases, it is firmly established by the more recent expressions of this Court." Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah, 484,
243 Pac. 2d., 747.
Defendant cites the cases of Bullock v. Luke, supra; Gren
v. Norton, 213 Pac. 2d, 356; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah,
276, 193 Pac. 2d, 437; Sine v. Salt Lake Tran~portation Co.,
106 Utah, 289, 147 Pac. 2d, 875, to support the proposition
that one is contributorily negligent as a matter of law for
not seeing and avoiding the effects of another's negligence.
Martin vs. Stevens, supra, stated in referring to these cases:
8
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"Each of them was decided upon the proposttlon
that the circumstances were such that the driver held
to be negligent as a matter of law, either observed,
or in the exercise of due care should have observed,
the manner in which the other driver was approaching
the intersection and clearly could, by ordinary reasonable care have avoided the collision. Or to state it
in other words, the negligence, or manner of driving,
of the other driver was such that the driver appraising
the situtaion was alerted to it, or by using due care
would have been so alerted in time so that by the
exercise of ordinary precaution, he could have avoided
the collision. And, in each of these cases, this seemed
to the Court so clearly manifest that reasonable minds
could not find to the contrary.''
Plaintiff contends that its agent, Lavoy B. Gale, looked
directly at defendant's vehicle on two occasions; first, approximately one-quarter of a block from the intersection, and secondly, a moment before the impact and that he also observed
the vehicle through his peripheral vision while proceeding
down the street. Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that
plaintiff's agent saw defendant's vehicle only in the first two
named instances, these facts are not sufficient or so clearly
manifest that reasonable minds could not find to the contrary
that plaintiff's agent was negligent as a matter of law. Mr.
Gale took corrective action upon becoming aware of defendant's
failure to observe the right-of-way, and the evidence does
not justify that a conclusion that an earlier lookout would have
put Mr. Gale aware of defendant's disregard to plaintiff's
right-of-way in sufficient time to avoid a collision. Generally,
the question of whether or not an action exercised by a driver
is reasonable is a question of fact and should be determined
by the trier of the fact, and even if the plaintiff were con9
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tributorily negligent as a mater of law, the question of whether
or not such negligence was a substantial. causative factor in
producing the collision is also one of fact to be determined
by the trier of the fact. Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163
Pac. 2d 510; Williams vs. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 6 Utah 2d. 283, 312 Pac. 2d 564.
In the case of Bates vs. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 218 Pac.
2d 209, plaintiff brought an action to recover damages when
his vehicle was hit by defendant's coal truck. The jury returned
a verdict for plaintiff but the trial court held plaintiff guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Point No. II
of plaintiff's appeal was that he was. free from any contributory
negligence which either proximately caused or contributed
to produce the accident.
The collision occurred on Highway 91 north of the intersection of Third West in Pleasant Grove, Utah. The plaintiff
was driving a pickup truck South of Pleasant Grove and stopped
for a ~top sign before entering the intersection. He looked
both ways and the road was clear, and he then proceeded into
the intersection at a speed of five to six miles per hour. When
plaintiff got past the center of Highway 91 and was nearly
through the intersection, he was hit by defendant's vehicle.
The court held that a party who first enters an intersection
as authorized becomes the favored driver and all other vehicles
approaching the intersection are obliged to yield the rightof"'way to him. In setting aside the trial court's ruling that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law, the Court held:
"In order to justify the trial court in upsetting plaintiff's judgment, defendant must prove that the evidence
10
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showed with such certainty that all reasonable minds
must so conclude, that plaintiff was negligent; and that
such negligence concurred in proximately causing his
own injury. We cannot agree that such a conclusion can
be reached.''
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's agent, Mr. Gale, observed the vehicle driven
by defendant as he approached the intersection and correctly
assumed that defendant would yield the right-of-way to him.
Upon discovery of Defendant's disregard to Plaintiff's rightof-way corrective action was taken by Mr. Gale to avoid the
collision. The evidence of record is not so clear that all reasonable minds with certainty must conclude that Plaintiff was
guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,
BUSHNELL, CRANDALL & BEESLEY

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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